Mental representations of significant others serve as storehouses of information about important individuals from one's life. Interestingly, these representations can also be triggered by a new person and applied to this person in the context of everyday interpersonal relations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) . When a new person activates a representation of a significant other, the person may come to be remembered as having qualities that he or she does not possess because these qualities describe the significant other. We propose that transference is best defined in terms of this exact process-in which a perceiver "goes beyond the information given" about a new person by inferentially filling in the blanks about him or her (Bruner, 1957 ; see also Andersen & Glassman, in press ). In the process, the truth of what was learned at encoding becomes confused with what was simply inferred on the basis of the significant-other representation (see also Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981) , such that false-positive memory is more likely to emerge. Moreover, by means of the basic mechanism of schema-triggered affect (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986) , the newly encountered person may also come to be evaluated in a manner consistent with the representation (Andersen & Baum, 1994) .
Recent findings (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) provide support for this information-processing model of transference, by demonstrating that transference (Freud, 1912 (Freud, / 1958 , also termedparataxic distortion (Sullivan, 1953) , does indeed occur in social perception.
1 That is, these findings indicate that biased inference and memory result when a significant-other representation is activated and applied to a new person. Hence, this basic process appears to underlie transference.
The aim of the present series of studies was to extend this recent research on transference (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) by examining in more depth the basic mental processes accounting for the phenomenon. Specifically, we examined the chronic accessibility (see Higgins, 1989; Higgins & King, 1981 ) of significant-other representations as a possible mechanism by which transference occurs. Chronic accessibility refers to an activation readiness or an activation potential of stored information in information processing, and reflects long-term processing influences on activation (Higgins, in press ). As such, chronicity acts to bias inferences with some regularity and is especially likely to do so when additively combined with transient influences on activation stemming from the immediate context (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Higgins & Brendl, in press) .
Demonstrating that significant-other representations operate as chronically accessible constructs would more firmly locate the transference phenomenon in the domain of theory and research in social cognition. Given that transference is a longstanding clinical conception, and one that has been subjected to little experimental investigation, this is of importance. That is, if transference is a function of chronically accessible significantother representations, the operation of these mental representations can be understood in terms of basic principles of chronic and transient influences on construct activation, and the transference concept would thus be further demystified.
The Information-Processing View of Transference
The information-processing perspective on transference maintains that transference occurs in everyday social judgment (Andersen & Cole, 1990 ; for reviews, see Singer, 1985 Singer, , 1988 Wachtel, 1981; Westen, 1988) . We argue that the process is sufficiently common, in fact, to occur on the basis of virtually any significant-other representation, not only on the basis of a parental representation (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) . For example, a representation of a sibling, uncle, best friend, teacher, lover, or spouse ought to have transference potential so long as this "other" is significant to the individual. If transference can indeed occur based on virtually any important individual-other representation, it may be even more ubiquitous than psychodynamic thinking implies, both because it extends beyond the unique relationship between a patient and a therapist, and because it involves various significant others.
Although the findings obtained thus far do not speak to assumptions about the special, primordial importance of parental or other early-childhood representations in transference, or to debates about the psychotherapeutic importance of transference (or types of transference analysis) in psychotherapy, these findings do demonstrate the process of transference in everyday social judgment; past experiences are superimposed onto a present stimulus person in a way that biases memory about the person. This is not solely a clinical phenomenon; the process would appear to be basic, and yet also a part of the widely held clinical assumption that human suffering can result from superimposing old interpersonal patterns learned with significant others onto other individuals in one's life. Well-controlled experimental research on transference is therefore important, in part because it may eventually help enable a meaningful empirical examination of this provocative assumption. (For nonexperimental research on processes in psychotherapy relevant to transference, see e.g., Horowitz, 1991; Luborsky & CritsChristoph, 1990 ).
Social-Construct Accessibility and the Structural Properties of Significant-Other Representations
When considering how knowledge about people is represented in memory and used in social interpretation, it is reasonable to assume that a network of interconnected social constructs exists and is brought to bear on interpretation as a function of transient contextual cues in the environment and of the inherent chronic accessibility of the construct for the person (Bruner, 1957; Higgins& King, 1981; Kelly, 1955) . When any set of social constructs happens to be accessed in tandem, it is often because of structural relations both between and within social constructs. That is, both interconcept and intraconcept linkages are associated with a construct's readiness to come to mind (Bruner, 1957; Higgins & King, 1981 ; see also Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990) .
With respect to significant others as social constructs, recent research has suggested that these representations have a number of properties pertinent to cognitive accessibility. Specifically, these representations are associatively rich (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Studies 1 & 2) in that more features are listed for representations of significant others in a standard feature-listing task than for representations of nonsignificant others or social categories. In addition, significant-other representations are highly distinctive in memory (Andersen & Cole, 1990 , Study 2) in that they yield rating asymmetries typical of cognitive reference points (Tversky, 1977 ; see also Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1989; Prentice, 1990; Srull&Gae-lick, 1983) . That is, the core features of significant-other representations are rated as less characteristic of related categories than the "core" features of these related categories are rated as characteristic of significant others. This suggests greater memorial distinctiveness in significant-other representations than in the categories studied.
2 Such structural factors should be linked to greater activation readiness. Indeed, research has shown that significant-other representations are highly cognitively accessible in that free-retrieval latencies to list the features of these representations are very short relative to latencies for other representations (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Studies 2 & 3) . Thus, both richness and distinctiveness co-occur with cognitive accessibility in significant-other representations, suggesting that they may be chronically accessible constructs.
Social-Construct Accessibility as Applied to
Individual-Person Exemplars Interestingly, investigations of social-construct accessibility (Higgins, 1989; Higgins & King, 1981) have tended to examine social categories that represent classes of people, social roles, 2 Research clearly supports the existence of this rating asymmetry, and hence, of distinctiveness in significant-other representations relative to relevant social categories (a stereotype or trait, Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 2) . This finding is reliable, but we take this opportunity to note that the distinctiveness analysis reported in Andersen & Cole (1990, Study 2, pp. 390-391) contained an error due to the computer program that generated the transformed data presented in Table 4 (discovered postpublication). The correct program produces means for this table (Andersen & Cole, 1990, pp. 391) in which those along the diagonal are each 7.00, as required by the analysis. This said, the means have the same general configuration reported, and the analysis yielded virtually the same findings. The one exception is that it was not only the case that significant-other representations were distinctive relative to related social categories, but also that nonsignificant-other representations were distinctive relative to related social categories. Hence, we cannot say that significant-other representations showed more distinctiveness than nonsignificant-other representations. Given the design of the study, however, it was impossible to test directly the relative distinctiveness of significant-other and nonsignificant-other representations; hence, this issue was beyond the scope of this past research (Andersen &Cole, 1990 , Study 2). occupations, stereotypes, or trait groupings-and that operate as points of comparison in assessing others (e.g., Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Brewer, 1988; Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Hamilton, 1979; Higgins, 1989; Schneider & Blankmeyer, 1983; Taylor, 1981; Uleman, 1989; Wyer & Martin, 1986; Wyer & Srull, 1986) . The argument has been made, however, that "proper" constructs, as in a "proper" name, are also social constructs, even though they are not categories per se (Higgins & King, 1981) , but rather, constitute individual-person exemplars ; see also Hill, Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Boss, 1989; Lewicki, 1985 Lewicki, , 1986 Read & Cessa, 1991) . In this sense, exemplars may be used as points of comparison for judging new individuals; that is, a representation of a specific person such as a significant other may function in social-information processing as does any other categorical social construct or prototype when applied to a new person, although little empirical work has examined this proposition. 3 An exemplar representation provides specific information about a specific person stored in memory, which, when accessed (either consciously or nonconsciously; , can be applied to a new individual (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) . Such an individual-person exemplar model can encompass both influences from representations of specific past experiences (e.g., Gilovich, 1981; Jacoby & Kelley, 1990; Smith, 1990; Smith & Branscombe, 1988) and from more abstract descriptive knowledge (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Higgins & King, 1981; Lingle, Altom, & Medin, 1983; Srull & Wyer, 1979 ; see also Alba & Hasher, 1983; Barsalou, 1990; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984) . This suggests that knowledge about a significant other, as a type of exemplar, may be represented in memory in various modalities (Andersen & Glassman, in press; ; see also Carlston, 1992) . A whole variety of information may thus be superimposed onto a new person who happens to resemble the representation, enabling various kinds of representation-consistent inferences about him or her. Although autobiographical or experiential knowledge has not yet been examined directly in research on significant-other representations (see Andersen, 1992) , data on descriptive knowledge clearly support the transference hypothesis.
Chronic Accessibility and the Use of Social Constructs
Numerous processes appear to contribute to the chronic accessibility of social constructs, that is, to the sheer frequency with which they are used (see Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) . Individual differences in construct accessibility are thought to arise from variations in past usage of particular constructs in particular situations, such that frequent activation in the past contributes to a construct's chronic readiness to be activated and applied to relevant stimuli (Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins et al., 1982 ; see also Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991) . In addition, research examining the "synapse" model of knowledge activation (Higgins, 1989) has shown that when a construct has been frequently activated the decay of its excitation level is slower than when it has been activated only once (Higgins et al., 1985 ; see also . Beyond this, studies have also demonstrated that chronically accessible constructs have a higher level of activation readiness for relevant stimuli than do nonchronic constructs (Bargh & Pratto, 1986) , and moreover, that they yield activation effects (in terms of target description recall) that persist (Higgins et al., 1982) .
Because research on chronic accessibility has typically examined trait constructs, however, this literature has left unexplored the potential chronicity of proper constructs or person exemplars, such as significant-other representations. Self-relevance, familiarity, and importance are all pertinent to the extent to which a construct comes to mind (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Markus, 1977; Prentice, 1990) , and significant-other representations are, by definition, not only frequently thought about but also highly important, familiar, and self-relevant.
Transient Influences on the Activation of Social Constructs
When considering the role of the frequency of a construct's activation in social inference, and more specifically, in transference, it is important to note as well the large and complex literature that exists on the recency with which a given construct was last used just prior to encountering a set of target stimuli. This literature concerns contextual priming effects in social judgment (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983; Herr, 1986; Higgins & King, 1981; Neuberg, 1988; Schwarz & Sudman, 1991; Smith, 1990; Srull & Wyer, 1979 ,1980 Wyer & Srull, 1986) . Typically, when a construct is triggered before a stimulus person is encountered, the newly encountered target is perceived in terms of the construct by being assimilated into it in the subsequent impression of the target (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Stangor, 1988; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992; . This effect has been obtained using target 3 Although no literature up until recently has existed on the role of significant-other exemplars in social perception, which we argue is the basis of transference (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) , an extensive experimental literature exists on the exemplar of the self and its role in memory and encoding not only about the self (e.g., Bargh &Tota, 1988; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Bellezza, 1984; Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Greenwald, 1980 Greenwald, , 1981 Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom etal., 1988; Markus, 1977; Markus&Wurf, 1987; Prentice, 1990; Rogers, 1981) , but also about other persons as well, which implies projection or false consensus (e.g., Bramel, 1962; Campbell, Miller, Lubetsky, & O'Connell 1964; Chronbach, 1955; Dornbusch, Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy, & Vreeland, 1965; Edlow & Kiesler, 1966; Fong & Markus, 1982; Holmes, 1968; Lemon & Warren, 1974; Marks & Miller, 1987; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) . Of course, the role of familiar-other representations in memory and in the speed of judgments about the familiar others themselves has been shown to be reliable (e.g., Prentice, 1990; Rogers, 1981) . But this is not the transferential process of interest here. Hence, it is clear that research on construct accessibility has focused little on the role in social judgment of individual-person exemplars (other than the self; although see . (For relevant work concerned with significant-other representations, see Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990; Baldwin & Holmes, 1987). descriptions that are ambiguous (containing features equal in similarity to two alternative constructs; e.g., see Higgins et al, 1977; Higgins, 1990) or vague (containing enough features to make a given construct potentially appropriate, but not so many so as to make it inevitable; see Srull & Wyer, 1979; Higgins, 1990 ). The target stimuli in such studies are thus relevant to the primed construct, even though evidence suggests that less relevance is needed as chronicity increases (Higgins & Brendl, in press ). On the other hand, studies of similar design often yield contrast effects when the construct's applicability to the target person is, for some reason, called into question (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Higgins & Stangor, 1988; Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Martin, 1986; Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Schwarz & Sudman, 1991) . Hence, although standard assimilation effects are commonly observed, they are not the only outcome of priming.
The Applicability of Stimulus Information in Construct Use
According to the synapse model of social-construct operation, featural overlap between triggering stimuli and knowledge stored in memory should increase the overall excitation levels of the stored knowledge (Higgins, 1989 (Higgins, , 1990 ; see also Higgins & Brendl, in press) . That is, the applicability of a representation to a stimulus person should contribute to its likelihood of use-in combination with the accessibility effects already noted, that is, those based both on chronic sources of activation and those based on transient sources (i.e., priming). In the synapse model, then, both accessibility and applicability contribute to construct use (Higgins & Brendl, in press ).
Research on activation emerging from the external environment has been limited virtually exclusively to activation based on priming before a target stimulus is encountered rather than activation based on the target stimulus itself. From our point of view, however, cues in a stimulus person may in fact trigger or activate a given representation, not simply in a passive way by permitting the use of the representation (because of the fit between the stimulus and the representation), but by directly (and because of the same fit) increasing the activation of the representation-as would any other relevant, transient influence from the external situation (e.g., as in priming). Our research on transference has relied on presenting information about a target person that concretely resembles a participant's own significant other, followed by the assessment of recognition memory, and using this design, has indicated that participants show more representation-consistent false-positive memory about the target stimulus who had resembled a significant other than in the control conditions (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3) .
Indeed, it has been suggested that any newly encountered person is likely to be compared with preexisting notions in memory that are similar to the encountered person, based on a simple similarity estimate between the person and the various representations, perhaps yielding a match in relation to a particular representation (Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978 ; see also Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Nosofsky, 1986; Rosch, 1978) . Such a match may thus lead to complex interpretive activity about the new person by triggering the application of the preexisting representation to the person-presumably with little cognitive effort (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Tota, 1988; Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; Smith & Lerner, 1986) or conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; ; see also Bornstein & Pittman, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1987 Kihlstrom, , 1990 ) and based on spreading activation through elaborate networks (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987 ; see also Collins & Loftus, 1975) .
In this sense, even though chronically accessible mental representations should have a chronic readiness to be used, such representations should nonetheless be more likely to be applied not only when primed in advance, but also when specifically evoked by a relevant target person (Higgins, 1989; Higgins & Brendl, in press ; see also Tversky, 1977) . That is, long-term sources of activation should combine additively not only with transient influences on activation derived from priming the representation in advance ; see also Erdley & D'Agostino, 1988; Hastie, 1981; Higgins, 1989, in press; Higgins & Brendl, in press; Higgins et al., 1977) , but also with transient influences derived from the fit between the actual stimulus person and the representation (i.e., the representation's applicability). As such, relevant stimulus cues in the target person may well increase activation. Both advanced priming and triggering stimulus cues may thus constitute potent sources of transient activation emerging from the external situation.
We regard the process of stimulus triggering as especially ecologically meaningful in transference. That is, transference may frequently occur in part because of concrete similarities between the target and a significant other. The contribution of any such overlap between the target stimulus and a significant-other representation to the activation of the representation is thus of special interest in transference. The concept of advanced priming would seem to be rather less meaningful, in that it is more analogous, for example, to having spoken to (or heard from) a particular significant other just before encountering the target person rather than to actually encountering a target who has characteristics corresponding to those of a significant other. Indeed, it may be the latter correspondence, in the real world, that accounts for why a transference response is more likely with one stimulus person than with another.
Chronic Accessibility in the Transference Paradigm
If significant-other representations are chronically accessible, they should have a greater readiness to be applied to a target person than less accessible constructs. Although research concerned with chronic accessibility has tended to compare chronic with nonchronic constructs, for obvious reasons, research on transference has taken the conservative approach of comparing significant-other representations with control representations that are self-generated, self-labeled, and self-characterized by the participant, that is, that come to mind in the experiment and may thus be rather chronically accessible themselves (Andersen & Cole, 1990) . In each of the present studies, participants learned about various fictional target persons, one of whom resembled their own significant other and the others of whom resembled control representations (either in the participant's own memory or not in the participant's memory). Importantly, the descriptors of each of these target persons contained an identical number of triggering stimulus cues (featural cues overlapping with the relevant representation) across conditions. Hence, potential differences in transient influences on activation across conditions were held constant and thus could not account for any greater activation effects in the significantother condition than in the control conditions in these studies, leaving relative chronicity as the explanatory mechanism.
In terms of our specific predictions, if significant-other representations are chronically accessible, greater false-positive memory should be observed when a target person resembles a significant other than in the control conditions-even when no priming occurs before the relevant target person is encountered Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Higgins et al., 1977 ; see also Higgins, in press). Because a chronically accessible construct is frequently activated and thus maintains a relatively high excitation level, it should be applied to a relevant target without prior priming. For this reason, we anticipated our falsepositive memory effect favoring significant-other representations would occur both under conditions of advanced priming and with no such priming. In addition, in line with evidence on the additivity of transient and chronic sources of construct accessibility , we expected that all representations existing in each participant's memory prior to a priming experience should be activated when primed, and that such priming effects should combine additively with chronicity. In the present study, the effects of significant-other activation should thus occur independently of advanced priming, although the latter should combine additively with these effects, as has been shown for other chronically accessible constructs. Although some of our prior work has demonstrated the significant-other activation effect in the absence of advanced priming (Andersen & Baum, 1994) , no work has directly assessed advanced priming in the emergence of the phenomenon.
In addition, although in Study 1 we held constant the stimulus-representation match in terms of the relevant representation in each condition, in Study 2 we explicitly varied the presence of triggering stimulus cues in the target person across conditions. In this way, we tested the hypothesis that the likelihood of activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person would be increased by the presence of triggering stimulus cues in this stimulus person-cues which should contribute to excitation in a way that combines with the excitation arising from the chronicity of the significant-other representation. That is, although the chronic accessibility of the significant-other representation should make the presence of triggering cues in the target person unnecessary in the emergence of the effect (Higgins, 1989 (Higgins, , 1990 Higgins et al., 1977) , this long-term source of activation should combine additively with transient sources of activation Higgins & Brendl, in press) such that false-positive memory favoring the significant-other representation is-greater when the significantother representation is triggered by the stimulus person than when it is not.
The Present Series of Studies
To test these hypotheses, we conducted two microcomputerbased studies in which participants learned about four fictional target persons and then completed a recognition memory test that asked them to rate their confidence that they had seen and learned representation-consistent descriptors about each target that were not presented. This measure of false-positive recognition memory (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3; Andersen & Baum, 1994 ) served as our index of "going beyond the information given" (Bruner, 1957) . In Study 1, half of the participants described their significant others in a preliminary featurelisting session held immediately prior to the learning trials-in the same session (as in Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3) . The other half participated in the preliminary session at least 2 weeks prior to the experimental session, with the learning trials eventually taking place in a different room with a different experimenter. Hence, in Study 1, both the significant-other representation and the nonsignificant-other representation were primed just prior to the learning trials (by means of a featurelisting task), or were not. In Study 2, the preliminary featurelisting session was always held at least 2 weeks in advance of the experimental session. This study examined the magnitude of the false-positive memory effect favoring the significant-other representation when this representation was triggered by the stimulus cues in the target person versus when it was not triggered by such cues.
In each study, participants learned about the four target persons in randomized blocks. One target always resembled the participant's own significant other. One control target always resembled another participant's significant other-so as to make sure that there is nothing special about just anyone's significant-other features that might produce the effect. In Study 1, another control target resembled the participant's own nonsignificant-other-a person representation in the participant's own memory but relatively nonsignificant. The remaining control target in Study 1 resembled another participant's nonsignificant other. In Study 2, one remaining control target resembled no single mental representation, but was comprised of features in the participant's own memory, that is, features that the participant had listed to describe various people (self-generated features, see Greenwald, 1982; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989) . The remaining target condition was essentially a no-trigger significant-other condition in which participants learned about a target who resembled another participant's significant other even though the memory test about this target person involved one of the participant's own significant others. This no-trigger condition enabled a test of the possibility that significant-other attributes may essentially be inferred about and applied to just about anyone-even without any concrete resemblance between the target and the significant other. This no-trigger condition also enabled a test of the exact role that stimulus triggering (vs. no such triggering) plays in the phenomenon.
Study 1

Method Overview
As in previous research (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3; Andersen & Baum, 1994) , participants named and characterized a significant other and a nonsignificant other by completing 14 sentences to describe each person. They did this either in a preliminary session held at least 2 weeks before the experimental learning trials, or in the same session (immediately before). In the learning trials, participants encountered information about four fictional target persons-each of whom resembled the participant's own significant other, the participant's own nonsignificant other, someone else's significant other, or someone else's nonsignificant other. Afterward, participants completed a recognition memory test.
Participants
Participants were 47 undergraduates (nearly equally from New York University and Stanford University) who participated in the experiment as part of a requirement for an introductory psychology course.
Materials and Procedure
Feature listing. Participants were informed that the study involved "how people think about and describe different types of individuals." In counterbalanced order, they named two individuals from their own personal lives, and then in a different counterbalanced order, completed 14 sentences to describe each. Participants considered a significant other to be a person "who is very important to you and has been for many years (perhaps a parent, relative, or friend);" they considered a nonsignificant other to be a person "who you do not know well, who is not particularly important to you, and who you are not very close to (e.g., a cashier you see at the store sometimes, a friend of a friend, or one of your professors)." As in previous research, about half of the significant others were family members (44%), with 22% of the total being mothers and 9% fathers; the remaining 56% were close friends (48%) and romantic partners (8%). The nonsignificant others were largely acquaintances (30%), not-so-close friends (28%), and various working people (e.g., manager, professor; 42%).
The feature-listing task consisted of 14 sentence-completion prompts, presented one at a time, which participants completed. The feature-listing prompts were held constant across conditions, as in previous research (Andersen & Cole, 1990 ). The prompt, "A person like" paired with "a NOUN" or "NAME," can easily be completed with "loves to sing in the shower" or "is very socially skilled," as desired.
(Name-only prompts operate comparably, Andersen & Baum, 1994.) Participants were asked to provide nonsynonymous descriptions that would distinguish each person from others (as in Andersen & Cole, 1990) . After describing each person, participants rank-ordered their listed sentences in terms of importance and uniqueness in characterizing the person, giving a "1" to the most descriptive and a "14" to the least. They then considered each person again and classified 30 randomly-ordered moderately-positive trait adjectives (shown in Appendix A) in terms of descriptiveness, by saying "yes" (Y) to a good descriptor, "no" (N) to a poor descriptor, or "I" to an irrelevant descriptor (one neither descriptive nor counterdescriptive), choosing exactly 10 of each, so as to provide sufficient "irrelevant" items for use as associatively-neutral filler items in the learning task (as in Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3) .
At this time, participants in the no-preceding-priming condition were offered the opportunity to participate in an allegedly independent study to help out some graduate students struggling to finish their degrees; most participants signed up for this future study. Participants were then sketchily debriefed, thanked for their participation, and excused (to be telephoned later by the "other" researcher). Participants in the featurelisting-prime condition, by contrast, were immediately introduced to a new experiment, which first entailed the completion of Raven's Progressive Matrices (as a distractor, as in Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3) and then the learning trials and memory test.
The learning trials and recognition-memory test. Participants in the no-preceding-prime condition were met individually, 2 to 4 weeks after their first session, by a new experimenter in a different experimental room of the same building, having been scheduled by telephone by the new experimenter. Participants in the preceding-prime condition participated in the learning trials in the same session in which they had listed descriptors to characterize both their significant other and their nonsignificant other. AH participants were seated at an IBM-compatible microcomputer and informed, by the computer, that the study would involve learning and memory, and that they would see a series of statements describing each of four fictional characters: Terry, Kelly, Sandy, and Pat (relatively gender-neutral names, Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3) . Participants were instructed to read each statement carefully so as to "remember the characteristics or qualities of each of the four people." 4 All participants read four sets of 10 sentences presented in randomized blocks, each concerning one of the four fictional people, and corresponding to the participant's own significant or nonsignificant other, or to the significant or nonsignificant other of another randomly-yoked participant. Each target statement consisted of a fictional-person name followed by a predicate (e.g., "Chris loves to read mystery novels." "Terry feels superior to everybody else."). Statements were presented in an individual random order within blocks.
Six of the 10 sentences presented in each block were those listed and ranked as moderately descriptive (ranks 6-11) in the feature-listing task; the remaining 4 were constructed from "irrelevant" adjectives. Each sentence was presented on a separate screen, signalled by an auditory-attention cue to prevent fatigue and distraction. After reading each statement, participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard, which did not terminate the presentation of the feature (it was on the screen for a full 4 s), and their latency to read each descriptor was calculated (indexed as the time between stimulus onset and pressing of the spacebar). The length of each descriptor presented (the number of characters per feature) was also calculated. Each sentence was patternmasked before the next was presented.
After viewing all 40 statements, and following a brief pause, participants were given the recognition-memory test. In this test, participants were instructed to try to remember the statements they had just learned about each target person. Specifically, they were told that they would see a series of statements paired with each target name which might have been presented in the learning phase about this target. For each statement, they were asked to indicate their confidence that they actually saw this statement about the particular target by rating it on a scale ranging from (1) (/ am certain this statement was NOT presented) to (4) (/ am certain this statement WiSpresented) (Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3; Andersen & Baum, 1994 ; see also Cantor & Mischel, 1977) . In particular, participants rated 60 sentences, 15 about each target, each on a separate screen, in an individual random order. In each set of 15 statements, 4 had actually been presented during the learning trials, that is, were true-positive statements: 2 were representation-consistent descriptors listed by the participant (ranks 7-8) and 2 were "irrelevant" fillers. The remaining 11 had not been presented, that is, were false-positive statements: 8 representation-consistent descriptors listed by the participant (ranks 1 -5 and 12-14) and 3 "irrelevant" fillers. 4 Because we instructed participants to memorize the target descriptors, rather than to form an impression of the target, participants were not especially likely to try to integrate the statements about each fictional character into a particular impression (as in Andersen & Cole, 1990, Study 3; see Wyer & Gordon, 1984; Wyer & Srull, 1986) . This reduced the likelihood that feature-based information-integration processes might influence our effects.
5 As indicated, the essence of transference is the process of "going beyond the information given" (Bruner, 1957 ) about a new person and thus the process of being more likely to remember that relevant unencountered features (i.e., false-positive features) were encountered about the person when he or she resembled a significant other than when he or she did not. Hence, transference is shown when this kind of relatively greater false-positive memory is observed based on a significant-other representation than based on control representations. Some research Manipulation check. After the memory test, participants were told that the experimental session was related to previous research in which they had participated, either in this same session (prime condition) or some weeks earlier (no-prime condition). We were thus able to ask participants to rate the similarity of each fictional character name to their significant other and nonsignificant other, respectively, using a 10-point scale. This rating was used to verify our resemblance manipulation; but it was clearly not a pure index either of similarity or of participants' awareness of such similarity during the experiment-because it followed our disclosure to participants that the initial significant-other description task was related to the experiment.
All participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
Manipulation Check
The target's resemblance to the participant's own significant other and nonsignificant other, respectively, was assessed by examining participants' ratings of the similarity of each target to each "other." That is, "matched" pairs, in which the significantother-relevant target was matched with the significant-other name and the nonsignificant-other-relevant target was matched with the nonsignificant-other name, were compared with "nonmatched" pairs (all others), in a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Preceding Prime/No Prime X University Location X Significant/ Nonsignificant other X Match /Nonmatch) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As anticipated, a highly significant main effect for match emerged, F( 1, 43) = 251.86, p < .0001 (match, M = 6.58; nonmatch, M = 1.15), indicating that our manipulation was successful.
The analysis also yielded an interaction between match and significance, F( 1,43) = 4.42, p = .04, indicating that although the match-nonmatch difference was substantial both in the significant-other condition (M = 7.02; M = 1.11), f(46) = 16.45, p < .0001 (planned contrast; see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985) and in the nonsignificant-other condition (M = 6.14; M = 1.19), t(46) = 11.08,p < .0001, as required, 6 more match was perceived for the significant other than for the nonsignificant other, Scheffe, p < .05; no such difference was observed when there was no match. Although greater resemblance for the significant other than for the nonsignificant other emerged in spite of identical procedures for manipulating match across conditions (in terms of number of features and the feature ranks used), the effect size for the interaction is small and cannot discount the very large effect size for degree of match. 7 No effects of the preceding-prime and campus location factors reached significance.
Biased Inferences: False-Positive Memory
We predicted that participants would be more likely to show representation-consistent false-positive memory about the has aJso shown greater true-positive memory as a function of significant-other activation (Andersen & Cole, 1990 , Study 3), presumably because such representations may operate as effective encoding devices (e.g., Prentice, 1990) , but this finding has also failed to replicate (Andersen & Baum, 1994) and is not relevant to the concept of transference per se. target when the target resembled the participant's own significant other than in the control conditions. Furthermore, we expected this finding to hold both when participants listed their original features in the same session as the experimental learning trials (as in Andersen & Cole, 1990 ) and when they listed them in a session that preceded the experimental session by 2 to 4 weeks. That is, if a significant-other representation can be activated by a new person in a current situation, this process should occur even when the significant-other representation is not primed in advance before the target information is encountered.
To examine this proposition, we calculated each participant's average recognition-confidence rating across the eight representation-consistent false-positive features in each condition and examined this score ina2X2X2X2 (Preceding Prime/No Prime X University Location X Participant's Own/Someone Else's X Significant/Nonsignificant other) ANOVA. As predicted, the analysis yielded a two-way Participant's Own/ Someone Else's X Significant/Nonsignificant Other interaction, F( 1, 43) = 9.37, p < .004. As shown in Figure 1 , the pattern of the means is exactly as we predicted. Specifically, participants were more likely, across both priming conditions and both university settings, to exhibit representation-consistent false-positive memory when the target resembled their own significant other (M = 2.23) than when the target resembled their own nonsignificant other (M = 1.91), f (46) = 3.21,p<.001. Moreover, they showed more false-positive memory for the target resembling their own significant other than for the target resembling the significant other of a yoked participant (M = 1.56), t (46) = 5.78, p < .0001, or for the target resembling the yoked participant's nonsignificant other (M = 1.64), t (46) = 5.67, p < .0001. No difference was observed when the target resembled someone else's significant other rather than someone else's nonsignificant other, t < 1. (Each within-subject planned contrast compared participants' average false-positive memory rating in one target condition vs. another by calculating a contrast score for each participant and comparing this average score to zero across participants, Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985.) No three-way interactions emerged in the omnibus analysis between our two-way effect and the prime or university-location factors, Fs < 2.45, ns. The four-way interaction was also nonsignificant, F < 1. Hence, we can conclude that our predicted 6 All planned contrasts were based on a priori predictions and hence are one-tailed, unless otherwise indicated; two-tailed tests are used in the case of a directional reversal (complete disconfirmation) of an a priori hypothesis.
7 It is possible that participants' lesser knowledge of nonsignificant others relative to significant others makes the features they list for nonsignificant others truly less diagnostic and colorful than those listed for significant others. Indeed, this may well reflect differences between these person representations in memory, a possibility that warrants further investigation. Familiarity influences the nature of mental representations (e.g., Fiske & Cox, 1979; Prentice, 1990) , and significant-other representations differ from nonsignificant-other representations in featural richness and accessibility (Andersen & Cole, 1990) . But because the exact same feature-ranks were used in both the significant-other and nonsignificant-other conditions (as in all conditions), resemblance was manipulated in equivalent fashion across conditions. effect operates across university location and preceding prime conditions. In terms of the prediction that advanced priming of any representation existing and hence available in the participants' memory should increase the activation and application of such a representation, we did in fact find the predicted two-way interaction between advanced priming and the target's resemblance to the participant's own versus to someone else's representations, F(l,43) = 6.56, p < .01. That is, exactly as predicted, the preceding-prime manipulation increased false-positive memory in those target conditions in which the primed representation actually existed in participants' memory and the memory test concerned these features (own, prime, M = 2.31; own, no prime, M = 1.84, ?(43) = 2.09, p < .025; someone else's, prime, M = 1.62, someone else's, no prime, M = 1.58, t < 1). More specifically, priming led to more false-positive memory than did the no-prime condition-both for the target resembling the significant other (prime, M -2.45; no prime, M= 2.01), f(43) = 1.93, p<. 03, and for the target resembling the nonsignificant other (prime, M = 2.16; no prime, M = 1.66), f (43) = 2.19, /? < .025. In short, the interaction between priming condition and the own-other factor reflects the fact that an unavailable (nonexistent) construct cannot be primed.
As this implies, the priming effect occurred independently of our essential chronic accessibility effect. That is, advanced priming had no impact on our predicted two-way interaction, which indicated more false-positive memory when the target resembled participants' own significant other than in the other conditions. More precisely, our within-subject contrast comparing false-positive memory when the target resembled the participant's own significant other versus their own nonsignificant other was highly reliable-both in the preceding-prime condition, t(23) = 5.42, p < .0001, and in the no-prime condition, t(22) = 2.50, p = .01. Moreover, although there was a main effect for priming condition, F( 1,43) = 5.09, p < .03, showing that false-positive memory was generally greater in the preceding-prime condition (M = 1.96) than in the no-prime condition (M = 1.71), this effect was clearly qualified by the interaction. Thus, these data clearly show that the influence of the transient prime in advance of encountering the relevant stimulus cues combined additively with the long-term sources of activation thought to be operative for significant-other representations, just as would be expected if significant-other representations were chronically accessible. The data in both the precedingprime condition and the no-prime condition are shown in Figure 2 .
Two additional findings emerging from the omnibus ANOVA are worth noting. First, the anticipated main effect for the ownother resemblance variable emerged, F( 1, 43) = 32.00, p < .0001, showing greater false-positive memory for available (existing) representations than for unavailable (nonexistent) ones-as denoted by someone else's features. Second, a main effect showed more false-positive memory for significant others than for nonsignificant others, F( 1, 43) = 4.60, p < .04, independent of the sources of the features. Both of these effects, of course, were also qualified by our predicted interaction between these two variables. No other effects reached significance.
As indicated, the data clearly demonstrate that the targets resembling the significant other lead to more false-positive memory than did the control targets-as shown in our predicted interaction between resemblance and significance. On the other hand, because it is possible that our predicted pattern of results (the 2.6l two-way interaction) could somehow have been produced as an artifact of the amount of time participants spent studying target features in the learning trial, we repeated our central analysis controlling for reading-time differences. The analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling the average amount of time participants spent reading the target descriptors yielded virtually identical results, with the predicted two-way interaction still highly significant, F{ 1, 42) = 8.46, p < .006. In addition, because the length of the features participants learned in one condition could have led the features to be more memorable than those in another condition, the average length of the features learned in each condition was also covaried out, and this again left the predicted interaction significant, F(\, 42) = 3.97, p -.05. Finally, falsepositive memory was predicted particularly for representationconsistent features. Hence, the same ANCOVA was conducted covarying out participants' recognition-confidence ratings for "irrelevant" false-positive items-those irrelevant to the representation and not presented in the learning trials. Again, the interaction remained significant, F( 1,42) = 34.68, p < .0001.
2.4"
Discussion
These data show once again our predicted false-positive memory effect favoring the significant-other representation and extend this work by showing that a significant-other representation can be activated by a relevant target person and applied to this person whether or not the representation has been primed immediately before encountering the relevant target features. That is, our predicted effect occurs whether or not the significant-other representation and the nonsignificant-other representation are primed in advance (by means of our feature-listing task), a finding that replicates across university contexts. When the target person resembled the participant's own significant other, this was associated with greater memory bias pertaining to their significant-other representation than resulted when the target resembled a nonsignificant other from the participant's own life and the memory bias was with respect to this nonsignificant other. The fact that the significance of the significant-other representation plays a role in this false-positive memory phenomenon suggests that these representations may differ in their chronic accessibility. In addition, comparison of the condition in which the target resembled the participant's own significant other with the condition in which the target resembled a significant other of another yoked participant further indicated that the effect is not driven simply by there being something "special" about the features of just any one's significant other-features that might make them cohere together in the target stimulus cues and in recognition-memory test features (for any participant) so as to account for this pattern in the data. Again, these data rule out artifactual accounts of the data and provide indirect support for our chronic accessibility interpretation.
Because the presence of triggering stimulus cues in the targets was held constant by our use of the same number of triggering cues with the same degree of rank-ordered relevance, the advantage for significant-other representations relative to these two control conditions cannot be accounted for by differences in stimulus triggering. The implication is that it is the chronic accessibility of the significant-other representation that accounts for the effect. Hence, the data support the notion that significant-other representations are chronically accessible; such constructs are in a continual state of readiness to be used and require no advanced priming to be applied Higgins, 1989) .
Moreover, if significant-other representations are chronically accessible, the chronicity effects associated with these representations should combine additively with advanced priming. Consistent with this hypothesis, the data show that our advanced priming manipulation influenced activation and application, and indeed, combined additively with our predicted significantother effect. These data are quite consistent with the literature on advanced priming and chronic accessibility Higgins & Brendl, in press) and thus provide support for the hypothesis that significant-other representations are chronically accessible.
On the other hand, precisely because stimulus triggering was held constant in this study, the data cannot speak to the exact role of such triggering stimulus cues in the target person in the false-positive memory effect favoring significant-other representations. Although chronically accessible constructs have a readiness to be activated, they should be most likely to be applied when the stimulus person encountered provides some additional excitation to the representation to lead to application (Higgins, 1989, in press) . That is, transient sources of activation in the target stimulus person-independently of advanced priming-should presumably combine together with long-term sources of activation in leading to construct use-a notion that extends what has been tested in the literature on advanced priming (see Higgins & Brendl, in press) in that it concerns triggering cues in the target person rather than advanced priming per se; nonetheless our prediction is consistent with work on chronic accessibility. When there are features in the stimulus person that specifically resemble a representation and are thus likely to lead to additional excitation in the representation, the relevant representation should be more likely to be applied to the target than when no such triggering occurs (Tversky, 1977) . Beyond triggering stimulus cues in the target person as a transient source of activation, the chronic accessibility of a significant-other representation should make it quite likely to be applied to a new person even in the absence of specific stimulus features that trigger the representation. In short, a significant-other representation may be applied to some degree to virtually anyone. Study 2 was designed to test these hypotheses.
Study 2
Method Overview
A preliminary stimulus-generation session was again held at least 2 weeks before the experimental session. In the experiment, participants learned about four fictional persons, one of whom resembled one of their own significant others. As usual, the recognition-memory test about this target involved the features of this same significant other. In a no-trigger significant-other condition, however, the target resembled a significant other of a yoked participant, even though the recognitionmemory test about this target involved the features of another one of the participants' own significant others (not the one involved in the standard significant-other condition). Hence, this condition involved no predesigned stimulus triggering, that is, no concrete overlap or match between the target person and the participant's significant other. In two control conditions, the target resembled either another significant other of the same yoked participant (with the memory test about this same person) or a set of self-generated person descriptors (constituting no single representation) with the memory test based on these descriptive features. In all but the no-trigger significant-other condition, the proportion of stimulus triggering cues in the target was held constant (at 60%), as in previous studies. Following these learning trials, the recognition-memory test was administered.
Participants
Thirty New York University undergraduates (16 women and 14 men) participated as part of a requirement for introductory psychology.
Materials and Procedure
Session 1: Feature listing. This session was run in a manner similar to the feature-listing session of Study I, except that participants named two significant others and also provided a set of no-representation person descriptors. In this feature-listing session, participants were first asked to complete sentences about various different people so that we could construct a self-generated no-representation control condition, used to index self-generation effects (see Greenwald, 1982; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989) in the absence of representational coherence. To ensure that the listed features in the no-representation condition were not influenced by having recently thought about a significant other, the norepresentation feature-listing task preceded the naming of (and listing of features for) participants' two significant others. Specifically, participants were asked to consider a list of randomly ordered names of 14 different well-known individuals (shown in Appendix B) and to complete one sentence to describe each person to distinguish the person from the others on the list. The names represented a wide variety of persons and did not cohere into any one representation. The sentencecompletion prompts were identical to those of Study 1. Six sentences were randomly selected for the learning trials.
"Neutral" filler items were identified for this condition by two independent judges, who indicated whether or not each of the 30 trait adjectives from Study 1 described each of the 14 persons by classifying an adjective as descriptive with a definite yes (y*) or a simple yes (y), as counterdescriptive with a definite no (n*) or a simple no (n), or as irrelevant (i).
8 Ten adjectives were selected nomothetically as " irrelevant" (calm, candid, casual, curious, idealistic, lucky, objective, orderly, positive, and romantic) ; these received no more than one definitive classification (definite yes or definite no) across all 14 targets and both raters (28 judgments) and received at least 9 "irrelevant" classifications (about one third of the judgments). Although these adjectives were not irrelevant to each individual, they did not add coherence among the individuals. After generating these no-representation descriptors, participants were asked to identify and list features for two significant others of equal importance that they considered "quite different from one another," so as to ensure relatively nonoverlapping representations. Of these, half were family members, with 22% of the total mothers and 8% fathers. The remaining 50% were close friends (37%) and romantic partners (13%).
Session 2: The learning trials and recognition-memory test. At least 2 weeks after the first session, participants completed the learning trials in which the target resembled either the participant's own significant other, a significant other of a yoked participant (two such targets), or the participant's own no-representation features, and then completed the recognition-memory test.
In the standard significant-other condition, in which the target resembled one of the participant's own significant others, the memory test about this target involved this same significant other. In the no-trigger significant-other condition, in which the target resembled a yoked participant's significant other, the memory-test items about this target corresponded to another of the participant's own significant others. Use of the first versus the second significant other listed by the participant in Session 1 for these two conditions was systematically counterbalanced. Two control conditions were also used. In one, the target resembled another significant other of the same yoked participant with the memory test corresponding to this same person, that is, the test features were descriptive of the same original person as were the target stimulus features, as usual; in the other, the target was characterized by the participant's own self-generated no-representation features with a corresponding memory test.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
The extent to which participants perceived the target descriptors as resembling the manipulated significant-other representation was examined by comparing the one condition in which the target actually resembled this significant other (i.e., where there was a match) with the remaining conditions (i.e., where there was no match) in terms of participants' similarity ratings to this significant other. As anticipated, the comparison between the matched and nonmatched cells, as in previous studies, revealed that the matched rating was far greater (M = 6.47) than the nonmatched rating (M = 3.52), t (29) = 6.11, p < .0001. The effect size for the contrast was again very large.
Biased Inferences: False-Positive Memory
Participants' representation-consistent false-positive memory was compared across target conditions in a one-way ANOVA. The analysis was highly significant, F( 3,87) = 12.14, p < .0001. As shown in Figure 3 , participants showed more false-positive memory when the target resembled the participant's own significant other (M = 1.74) than in the remaining conditions(M= 1.57, M= 1.35, M= 1.29). The contrast pitting the standard significant-other condition with the two control conditions (excluding the no-trigger significant-other condition) was highly significant, t (29) = 4.98, p < .0001. The difference was significant both when comparing the significantother condition with the no-representation condition, t (29) = 4.94, p < .0001, and with the condition in which the target resembled someone else's significant other, t (29) = 4.31, p < .0001. Hence, these data replicate those reported in Study 1 and extend the prior data by using a control target condition reflecting self-generated features that do not cohere together into any single mental representation and yet have enough individual chronic accessibility to have been listed by participants.
As in Study 1, three ANCOVAs were also conducted to rule out alternative explanations based on potential differences in average reading time, feature length, and recognition confidence ratings for irrelevant false-positive items and each left the overall effect significant (ps < .0001).
To examine the prediction that triggering cues in the stimulus person are important in the activation and application of significant-other representations, a contrast was calculated comparing false-positive memory in our standard trigger significantother condition with that in the no-trigger significant-other condition. Our contrast showed, as predicted, more false-positive memory concerning participants' own significant-other features under conditions of target triggering {M = 1.74) than under conditions of no such triggering, that is, when the target resembled someone else's significant other (M = 1.57), / (29) = 1.96, p < .03. Hence, the data demonstrate that a triggering effect of stimulus cues in the target person exists and is influential in the activation and application of a significant-other representation. Moreover, the data also indicate that significantother activation and application readily occurs even when not specifically provoked by matching cues in the target person, that is, triggering cues (M = 1.57) as compared with the control conditions (M = 1.35; Af = 1.29), t (29) = 3.30, p < .005. In particular, the contrasts showed more false-positive memory in the no-trigger significant-other condition than in the no-representation condition, t (29) = 3.31, p = .001, and more in the no-trigger significant-other condition than in the condition in which the target resembled someone else's significant other with a corresponding memory test, t (29) = 2.70, p < .006. Hence, it appears that direct stimulus triggering based on cues in the target person is not necessary for the occurrence of the significant-other effect on false-positive memory.
Together, the results offer strong support for the hypothesis that significant-other representations are chronically accessible. Significant-other representations appear to be applied to new target persons even when not triggered by stimulus cues in the targets, that is, even when there is no concrete featural similarity between the new person and the significant other. On the other hand, transient influences on activation are nonetheless important in producing significant-other activation effects in that triggering cues in the target person contribute to significant-other activation. Stimulus triggering in the target combines with the chronicity of the significant-other representation in predicting activation and application.
General Discussion
Using a methodology that combined idiographic stimulusgeneration procedures with a nomothetic experimental design, two studies were conducted to extend previous findings concerned with transference in everyday social perception (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen & Cole, 1990) . The purpose of these studies was to assess the hypothesis that a mechanism underlying the use of significant-other representations in social perception is the chronic accessibility of these representations. The results provide converging evidence in support of this proposition. In particular, the data indicate that a significant-other representation can be activated and applied to a relevant target person, even when the representation is not primed in advance before encountering the target. That is, in the absence of any advanced priming, false-positive memory is more pronounced concerning the participant's own significant-other representation than in the control conditions (Studies 1 & 2). In addition, the data indicate that long-term sources of activation combine additively with transient sources of activation-when this transient contextual influence is operationalized both in terms of presence or absence of advanced priming and in terms of the presence or absence of triggering stimulus cues in the target person. That is, more false-positive memory is observed favoring the significant-other representation whether or not there is advanced priming and whether or not the target person specifically triggers the significant-other representation based on direct resemblance. Hence, although both priming and stimulus triggering similarly increase activation and application, the effect favoring significant-other representations relative to controls appears to occur in the absence of priming and when the target person does not trigger the significant-other representation (by means of a specific resemblance). These findings concerning the dual role of chronic and transient sources of activation clearly link the operation of significant-other representations in transference to the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations.
Chronic Accessibility in the Memory Biases of Transference
Across both studies, the data support the proposition that significant-other representations are chronically accessible, in that these representations have a special readiness to come to mind and to be used in social perception (Higgins & King, 1981) . These are the first data we know of demonstrating the chronic accessibility in social judgment of a "proper" construct or individual-person exemplar , suggesting that properties of chronicity in accessibility operate comparably among such n-of-one representations as they do among other social constructs (which designate multiple-« interpretations). Most research relevant to construct accessibility has concerned individual trait terms (such as, honest or adventurous; e.g., Higgins & King, 1981; Higgins & Brendl, in press; Wyer & Srull, 1981) , nomothetically defined, as well as more complex social categories, such as stereotypes (Brewer, 1988; Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986 ). Significant-other representations are proper constructs or individual-person exemplars and are idiographically defined (See Andersen & Glassman, in press) , and yet appear to be chronically accessible in everyday social perception. Hence, these data make it very clear not only that a significantother representation can be used to interpret information about a new target person in a manner that biases memory (Andersen & Cole, 1990) and that this may be accounted for by the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations, but also that such idiographically defined «-of-one representations-as proper constructs-can be chronically accessible.
Because significant-other representations derive from one's own interpersonal experiences with significant others, they are obviously based on considerable frequency of activation. Moreover, the associative meaning of a given significant-other representation is likely to be rich, intricate, personally important (Andersen & Cole, 1990) , and affectively laden (Andersen & Baum, 1994 )-all factors that are likely to be relevant to its chronic accessibility. Indeed, our evidence strongly supports the assumption that significant-other representations are chronically accessible, both by showing that transient influences on activation derived from advanced priming combine additively with the chronicity of significant-other representations in influencing memory (see ; see also Higgins, 1989) and by showing that transient influences deriving from overlapping stimulus cues in the target person combine similarly with the chronicity of significant-other representations in influencing memory (see Higgins & Brendl, in press) . A target person is especially likely to be interpreted in terms of a chronically accessible construct both if this representation is primed in advance and if it is concretely relevant to or applicable to the stimulus person (Higgins, 1989) . Each type of transient influence on activation appears to add excitation to the significantother representation, increasing its overall activation potential (Higgins, in press ).
More specifically, the fact that our data indicate greater significant-other activation effects when features in the target person trigger the representation than when there is no such concrete overlap between the stimulus and the significant other provides a clear demonstration of the role of stimulus triggering in transference. The effect is more likely to occur when the significant-other representation is applicable to the stimulus. On the other hand, the fact that the effect emerges even when the representation is not concretely applicable to the stimulus, that is, in the absence of explicit overlapping cues in the stimulus person, also provides compelling evidence for the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations. That is, the significant-other representation does indeed appear to be applied to virtually any new other even when the new other does not concretely resemble the significant other. These data demonstrate that the transference phenomenon, which is based on the activation and application of significant-other representations in everyday social perception, can be understood in terms of the dual role of both chronic and transient influences on significant-other activation, including relevant triggering cues in the target person.
On a different note, although it is conceivable that some of our participants may have explicitly recognized the features of one of the targets as being those they had listed earlier (to describe their significant other or nonsignificant other) rather than simply being reminded of the person in a more tacit or nonconscious way by the target's features, we do not think it probable that this accounts for the obtained effects. That is, it could be argued that strategic responses to demand characteristics may have been at play in our results, in that participants may have used a recognition of the link between the two sessions of the experiment (between the earlier listed and the later learned features) to strategically produce the obtained effects because they believed it would reflect well on them. There is no a priori reason, however, that participants should have assumed that showing more false-positive memory in the significant-other condition than in the nonsignificant-other condition would reflect well on them or would match the hypotheses of the experiment. Indeed, it seems more likely that participants might assume that less false-positive memory rather than more would be what is most desired, that is, more accuracy in the task. Consistent with this interpretation, the literature on contextual priming effects suggests that greater awareness of contextualactivation influences may lead to contrast effects, making assimilation effects of the sort we have predicted and obtained less likely rather than more (e.g., Lombardi et al., 1987; Martin et al., 1990) . On the other hand, because we have no data that directly speak to this issue, we cannot rule it out as a factor in our obtained effects, even though the pattern of findings from both studies is consistent with the explanation that significantother representations are chronically accessible, the explanation we favor.
Concluding Comments
The present data replicate and extend research on the information-processing consequences of significant-other activation in transference (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen & Baum, 1994) , in part by more definitively controlling for alternative explanations of the phenomenon, and in part by demonstrating that significant-other representations operate as chronically accessible constructs. That is, the data show that significant-other activation and application in transference occurs even in the absence of priming the representation before the target stimulus is encountered and in the absence of any concrete similarity between the target and the significant other. At the same time, it appears to be the combined effect of transient sources of activation (both by means of priming and contemporaneous triggering cues in the target person) and long-term sources of such activation that leads to the greatest false-positive memory (see also Bargh et al., 1986, Higgins & Brendl, in press ). Together, these data support the argument that chronic accessibility is a basic mechanism underlying transference effects in social perception, demystifying the transference concept and locating it more firmly within the nexus of basic processes in social cognition pertaining to chronic and transient influences on construct activation.
